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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action commenced by the respondent for breach 
of an employment agreement, whereby respondent al leged tt lat 
appellant failed to pay respondent one-third (1/3) of respondent's 
/f-»d! 1/ sal ."ii v ii|inii lii s h'ni'inat m n | "iirsiian l h> pai uqraph ±{t) of 
the employment agreement. ^Appellant answered and counterclaimed, 
alleging that cause for dismissal was sufficient under frn terms 
of the agreement because respondent 
dismissal were unethical and constituted - .ict n-;<.raL : lrpitude. 
DISPOSITION COURT 
This i s an a p p e a l by a p p e l - ^ n • .* •• • HP judgment of ~ne 
trial court i n favor of the respondent ' -^--.- -is heard -v the 
Honor abl e Dav id I t. I K1 e , J ud g e <) l[ 1 h c "H i i r. < i «I ud I c i, a I Di s 1.1; i. ei "C"« :> ur t 
of S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Utah. 
STATEMENT ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
What is the standard of conduct which constitutes 
unethical conduct and moral turpitude, and whether the trial court 
erred i i I i lot c • 7 i nq cippel Ian I. I" s mot: ion loi .j m„ *i trial. 
Appellant seeks a determination reversing the decision of 
the lower court, finding that respondent was discharged for cause 
and that the acts or t.ne respondent which had led lo Ins dismissal 
were unethical and constituted an act of mora turvitua*-. 
tl: le alternative that I lie ii i.ni com I " s Fimli 
Conclusions of Law were erroneous and that appellant is entitled 
to a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 5, 1980, appellant and respondent entered 
into an employment agreement. (R. 68) Under the terms of the 
employment agreement, the respondent was to act as club manager 
and perform certain designated services. Paragraph 1(f) of the 
employment agreement sets forth the conditions by which the 
appellant could terminate respondent's employment: 
If, in the judgment of the board of directors of 
the employer [Willow Creek Country Club], the 
manager [plaintiff] fails to perform any of his 
obligations or duties hereunder, and the board 
of directors determines that the conduct of the 
manager is unethical, involves gross negligence 
or a breach of moral turpitude, this contract 
shall terminate at the option of the employer 
upon thirty (30) days notice to the manager. In 
the event, however, the employer shall wish to 
terminate this contract without sufficient cause 
or reason, employer shall pay manager one-third 
(1/3) of one year's salary as liquidated damages 
(emphasis added). 
On January 23, 1983, pursuant to the recommendations of 
appellant's board of director's, respondent's employment was 
terminated. (R. 68) Appellant, in terminating respondent's 
employment, claimed that certain actions by the respondent were 
unethical and involved acts of moral turpitude. These acts were: 
1. Respondent issued salary checks to appellant's 
employees from which checks respondent did not deduct federal and 
state taxes and FICA; 
2. Respondent issued salary checks to individuals for 
services rendered who were not employed by appellant; 
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3. Respondent issued salary checks to one of appellant's 
employees [Frank Rotunno], which check allegedly compensated that 
employee for living expenses and travel expenses without consider-
ation to the appellant; 
4. Respondent issued bonus checks to two (2) employees 
and required those employees to pay him some amount from those 
bonus checks as a cash kick-back; 
5. Respondent received services at his personal 
residence from two (2) of appellant's maintenance workers when 
these employees were on duty for appellant, and for which 
appellant received no compensation. (R. 13) 
Based on each of these allegations, appellant contended 
that it had sufficient cause to terminate the respondent's 
employment pursuant to paragraph 1(f) of the employment agreement. 
Subsequent to trialf the court ruled that none of 
respondent's actions were acts which amounted to gross negligence, 
unethical conduct or acts of moral turpitude. The court found 
that appellant breached its employment agreement with respondent 
in that it terminated respondent without cause and failed to pay 
respondent one-third (1/3) of his annual salary as liquidated 
damages. (R. 108-109) 
The trial court thus determined that the respondent had 
been damaged in the amount of $13f800, plus interest at twelve 
percent (12%) per annum from January 23, 1983 to the date of 
judgment, and attorney fees and court costs incurred in enforcing 
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the employment agreement, (R. Ill) 
The appellant objected to the original judgment rendered 
by the trial court for the reason that the court failed to make 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Counsel for respondent 
thereafter submitted prepared Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, (R. 98-100) 
Appellant objected to Finding of Fact No. 17 for the 
reason that respondentf in his answer to appellant's counterclaim, 
admitted that he received funds from a bonus given to Donna 
Hagblom, an employee of Willow Creek Country Club. At the trial, 
respondent denied that he received any funds from Donna Hagblom in 
any amount and stated in direct examination that he received no 
kickback funds from Donna Hagblom. (R. 268-269) Donna Hagblom 
testified unequivocably that respondent stated on two occasions 
that he would give her a bonus if she would return part of it to 
him in cash and keep quiet about it. (R. 235-236) The appellant 
also objected to Conclusions of Law Nos. 3, 5, 6 and 7 upon the 
grounds that the Court should have concluded that the admitted 
receipt of a kickback from Donna Hagblom on two occasions was a 
payment to the respondent of an unauthorized bonus which amounted 
to embezzlement of appellant's funds. (R. 99) 
The appellant further objected and argued that the court 
should have concluded that accepting services from appellant's 
employees while on duty was a theft of services under 
§76-6-409(2), Utah Code Annotated. (R. 99) 
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Appellant objected to Conclusion of Law No. 3 for the 
reason that the actions of respondent constituted unethical 
conduct or acts involving moral turpitude. Appellant asserted 
that the findings of the trial court that appellant was entitled 
to setoff against the judgment constituted a recognition that 
respondent received services from appellant's employees without 
compensating appellant. (R. 99-100) Theft of services over $100 
is a Class A misdemeanor and theft of funds in excess of $250 is a 
third degree felony. See §76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated. 
The trial court on April 10, 1985, entered an amended 
judgment entitling respondent to the sum of $13,800, together with 
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the 
date of judgment, and entitling the respondent to the costs of the 
action in the amount of $41.50 and attorney fees in the amount of 
$3,500. Further, the trial court in its Order awarded appellant 
an offset of $105 against the above judgment for personal services 
rendered for respondent by employees of appellant while on company 
time. On May 24, 1985, the trial court entered an order denying 
appellant's motion for a new trial and rejecting appellant's 
objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The court 
ordered that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were to 
remain as entered on April 10, 1985. (R. 110-111) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent's receipt of unauthorized kickbacks and 
services constituted acts of moral turpitude and unethical conduct 
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and therefore, under the terms of the employment agreement entered 
into between appellant and respondent, respondent was properly 
discharged from his employment. The trial court erred in not 
granting appellant's motion for a new trial in that the evidence 
did preponderate to appellant's benefit, showing that respondent 
did request and did receive unauthorized kickbacks and services 
from appellant's employees. The trial court found that the 
appellant was entitled to an offset of $105 against the judgment 
amount entered based upon respondent's receipt of services from 
employees of appellant, while these employees were on duty for 
appellant. This in itself would constitute theft of services 
pursuant to §76-6-409(2), Utah Code Annotated, which must be 
considered as unethical conduct on the part of respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RECEIPT OP UNAUTHORIZED "KICKBACKS" AND SERVICES BY 
RESPONDENT CONSTITUTES ACTS OF MORAL TURPITUDE 
A. The Receipt of Unauthorized Kickbacks from Employee 
Donna Hagblom Constitutes Acts of Moral Turpitude. 
In her testimony before the court, Donna Hagblom was 
questioned as to whether she was required to return to the 
respondent certain portions of two checks written on the account 
of appellant in the amounts of $300 and $419.85 advanced to her as 
a "bonus". Mrs. Hagblom testified as follows: 
Question: How did the [opportunity to receive 
the bonus] come about? 
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Answer: ...I know Mr. Rotunno and Mr. Aarts 
were downstairs having lunch and they called me 
over there. 
Question: When you say "downstairs having 
lunch," where was that? At the club? 
Answer: At the Willow Creek Country Club in the 
Willow Room. 
Question: Okay. Go on. 
Answer: And they called me over and said there 
was some money in the gratuity fund and they 
were going to give me a check and I was to give 
part of it back to Mr. Aarts. (R. 232-233) 
*** 
Question: Exhibit 6 contains a check for $300 
written to Donna Hagblom. Is that the $300 that 
you are — 
Answer: Yes it is. 
Question: — describing for the court? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: What specifically did they ask you to 
do with respect to the money? 
Answer: To give half of it back to Mr. Aarts. 
Question: In cash? 
Answer: Yes. Uh huh. 
Question: And did you question them at that 
time? 
Answer: No, I didnft. 
Question: What did you in fact do when you 
received the $300 check? 
Answer: I cashed it, and I gave $150 to Mr. 
Aarts. 
Question: Where did this transaction take 
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place? 
Answer: It was in his office, and I went in and 
put it on his desk. (R. 233) 
The witness Mrs. Hagblom further testified that the 
respondent and herself had a conversation in the respondent's 
office where he told her he would give her a check out of the 
gratuity fund for a certain amount of money if she would give him 
all but $100 of it back. At trial, the witness testified as 
follows: 
Question: Mrs. Hagblom, I call your attention to 
December, 198 2. Did you have an opportunity to 
receive a bonus in December, 1982? 
Answer: Yes, I did. 
Question: I call your attention to Exhibit 6 
again, the face fly leaf you described on that 
exhibit has an amount of $450 [$419.85 after 
taxes] and the initials of Mr. Aarts. Do you 
recall a meeting you had with Mr. Aarts 
concerning this authorization? 
Answer: Yes, I do. 
Question: Where did that meeting take place? 
Answer: In his office. 
Question: And who was present? 
Answer: Just Mr. Aarts and myself. 
Question: And do you remember how that meeting 
came about? 
Answer: Well, he just called me in and told me 
he was going — if he gave me a check out of the 
gratuity fund for this amount of money if I would 
give him all but a hundred dollars of it back. 
Question: Did you question him as to why he 
wanted you to do that? 
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Answer: No — he was my superior. I didn't 
question him. 
Question: Did he suggest to you anything about 
keeping the matter confidential? 
Answer: Yes. He said "Don't say anything to 
anybody." Of course I said I wouldn't, but I 
did. (R. 235-236) 
*** 
Question: [Mr. Haslam] Now, after you received 
the check, what did you do after that? I'm 
talking about the $419.85 check. 
Answer: I went down to the bank and cashed it. 
Question: And did you return the funds to Mr. 
Aarts? 
Answer: All but $100 of it. 
Question: So you gave Mr. Aarts $300 of the 
$419.85? 
Answer: Right. 
Question: Now, after that transaction had taken 
place, did you have an occasion to have a 
conversation with any other person at Willow 
Creek Country Club about the transaction? 
Answer: Yes, I did. It was about a week or so 
later and Annie Laurie [Baker, a Willow Creek 
employee] was coming out of the ladies restroom 
and she was really upset and was feeling very 
bad. And I said, "I know how you feel. I don't 
feel right about it, but please don't say 
anything about it to anybody." (R. 236-237) 
At trial, Annie Laurie Baker testified that she had 
spoken with the witness Donna Hagblom about the fact that Mrs. 
Hagblom had received several bonuses from Mr. Aarts and had been 
asked to return part of the bonus to Mr. Aarts. At trial she 
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testified: 
[Annie Laurie Baker]: We were talking about the 
fact that she [Donna Hagblom] had received 
several bonuses from Mr, Aarts and had been 
asked to return part of the bonus to Mr. Aarts. 
The Court: Okay. 
Question: [Mr. Haslam] Okay. After you had 
that conversation with Donna Hagblom, what 
happened after that Mrs. Baker? 
Answer: Well, that was a Friday afternoon. And 
Monday morning I repeated the conversation to 
Chell [a Willow Creek Country Club employee], 
and Chell called Byron Watts [at that time 
president of Willow Creek Country Club]. Byron 
Watts called Bert Bruns [a member of the Board 
of Directors of Willow Creek Country Club at 
that time], and Bert Bruns came out and talked 
to both Chell and me. And the very next day I 
knew they had fired Mr. Aarts. (R. 205-206) 
Testimony at trial was clear that the respondent could 
not share in bonuses paid from the appellant's gratuity fund. 
Testifying before the trial court, Annie Laurie Baker testified: 
Question: [Mr. Haslam] Now, who had the 
discretion to — to give bonuses at Willow 
Creek Country Club while you were working 
there? 
Answer: Mr. Aarts. 
Question: And did Mr. Aarts as manager share 
in those gratuities? 
Answer: No, he did not. 
Question: Those are just specifically for the 
employees? 
Answer: Uh huh. (R. 211-212) 
The record demonstrates conclusively that respondent did 
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in fact receive unauthorized kickbacks from bonuses paid to the 
witness Donna Hagblom from a Willow Creek Country Club account, 
and these kickbacks precipitated respondent's termination. 
The respondent, in response to the allegations set forth 
in paragraph 4 of appellant's counterclaim (R. 14)/ admitted that 
employee Donna Hagblom was paid a bonus of $419.85/ and further 
admitted that iMrs. Hagblom returned some of that to respondent/ 
but alleged that she did so of her own accord. 
In defining the term "moral turpitude"/ the courts have 
determined as follows: 
Moral turpitude is an act of baseness/ vileness 
or depravity in the private and social duties 
which a man owes to his fellow man, or to 
society in general/ contrary to the accepted and 
customary rules of right and duty between man 
and man. It appears from the authorities to the 
rule without exception/ that the offense of 
obtaining money from another by fraud or false 
pretenses/ or larceny after trust/ or crimes 
malum in sef involve moral turpitude. 
Huff v. Anderson/ 90 S.E.2df 329 (Ga. 1955). 
The testimony is clear and convincing that the activity 
engaged in by the respondent with respect to receipt of the funds 
from Donna Hagblomf in and of itself constituted acts of moral 
turpitude. The board of directors of appellant concluded that 
respondent breached a duty owed to appellant/ and thereafter 
terminated respondent pursuant to paragraph 1(f) of the employment 
agreement. (R. 222) 
The question of whether certain actions constitute acts 
-11-
of moral turpitude is a question of law to be determined from the 
record on appeal. See In Re Pearce, 136 P.2d 969f 970 (Utah 
1943). The Utah Supreme Court has held that moral turpitude is 
anything done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty or good 
morals. Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, 
regardless of its being punishable by law. Moral turpitude is 
adaptive; it is determined by the state of the public morals and 
the common sense of the community. See In Re Pearce, supra, pp. 
9 71-972. In Re Pearce approved each one of these definitions in 
and of themselves as adequate to constitute moral turpitude. 
Certainly the respondent's actions were contrary to the 
duties he owed the appellant, and on this basis alone, the court 
should have determined that the actions of respondent involved 
moral turpitude. 
B. Respondent Wrongfully Deprived Appellant Of 
Employee's Services. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court 
determined as follows: "During the course of plaintiff's employ-
ment with defendant, and in response to plaintiff's request, Kevin 
Stewart, a maintenance man employed by the defendant, cleaned 
plaintiff's house on several occasions, working a total of twelve 
hours. Plaintiff paid Stewart occasionally for these services, 
which Stewart provided while he was on duty at the Willow Creek 
Country Club." (R. 105-106) (Emphasis added) 
During respondent's course of employment with appellant, 
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and in response to respondent's request/ Steve Draper [a 
maintenance man employed by appellant], serviced respondent's 
evaporative [swamp] cooler for approximately two hours while he 
was on duty for appellant, (R. 106) 
Paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law provides that 
"plaintiff must reimburse defendant for the services of its 
maintenance menf for a total of fourteen hours at $5.00 per hourf 
plus $35 for transportation costsf or a total offset of $105." 
(R. 108) 
The trial court recognized that the respondent wrongfully 
appropriated the services of appellant's maintenance men. This 
amounts to a theft of services/ proscribed by §76-6-409(2)/ Utah 
Code Annotated/ which states: 
(2) A person commits theft iff having control 
over the disposition of services of another/ to 
which he knows he is not entitled/ he diverts 
such services to his own benefit or to the 
benefit of another who he knows is not entitled 
thereto. 
Theft of services of $100 is a Class A misdemeanor/ and 
theft of funds in excess of $250 is a third degree felony. 
§76-6-412/ Utah Code Annotated. As noted in In Re Pearcey 136 
P.2d 969/ 970 (Utah 1943)/ the actual conviction of a crime in and 
of itself does not determine whether an act constitutes moral 
turpitude. Generally crimes "malum in se" involve moral turpitude. 
See In Re Pearcey supra. "Malum in se" is defined as a wrong in 
itself; an act or case involving illegality from the very nature 
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of the transaction, upon principles of natural, moral, and public 
law. An act is said to be "malum in se" when it is inherently and 
essentially evil, that is, immoral in its nature and injurious in 
its consequences, without any regard to the fact of its being 
noticed or punished by the law of the State. See Black's Law 
Dictionary 5th Ed. p. 865 (1978). 
In committing an act which is "malum in se", the person 
is presumed to intend an actual consequences of his act, and 
general criminal intent with which an act is done may be inferred 
from the words and conduct of the actor. See Peck v. Dunn, 574 
P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1978). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL CODRT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
In its Findings of Fact the trial court found that "At 
the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the defendant withdrew 
the following claims for damages that it made in its counterclaim: 
(a) $1,900 in living expenses and travel expenses paid 
to Frank Rotunno; 
(b) $300 of Frank Rotunno1s bonus which appellant 
alleged respondent forced Rotunno to return to him in cash; and 
(c) $300 of Donna Hagblom's $419.85 bonus, and $150 of 
her $300 bonus, which appellant alleged respondent forced her to 
return to him in cash. (R. 105) 
Subsection (c) of the trial court's Findings of Fact in 
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paragraph 10 is without basis* The transcript clearly demon-
strates that counsel for appellant specifically reserved its claim 
regarding the claim for damages respecting respondent's 
instructions to the witness Donna Hagblom to return a substantial 
portion of the bonus taken from Willow Creek funds. The 
transcript reads as follows: 
Mr. Haslam: I will withdraw the counterclaim as 
far as Mr. Rotunno is concerned, but if your 
Honor finds these violations with respect to the 
services performed to the Club — pardon me, 
from Mr. Aarts by the Club maintenance men, I 
think we should have a judgment for the value of 
those services and also the money that was 
turned back, the club money that was turned 
back, from Mrs. Hagblom and Mr. Rotunno, and 
that in accordance with the evidence, there was 
a transfer of that. But there is surely $300 
which was returned by Mrs. Hagblom and $150 paid 
by Mrs. Hagblom.... (R. 279-280) 
Appellant objected to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, citing Mrs. Hagblom1s testimony that she would 
receive a "bonus" if she would return $300 to Mr. Aarts. (R«, 99) 
Where the trial court has denied the motion for a new 
trial, the trial court's denial will be reversed if "the evidence 
to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust." Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982); 
Pollesche v. Transamerican Insurance Company, 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 
P.2d 236 (1972). 
As set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the court in making its ruling did not take into account the 
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claims of the witness Donna Hagblom, mistakenly believing that 
these claims had been withdrawn. Since the trial court did not 
take the claim under consideration, there is considerable pre-
judicial effect on the outcome of this case. One of appellant's 
major assertions is that respondent's actions in taking 
appellant's money to award a "bonus" to an employee in order to 
receive a kickback from that employee, constituted an act of moral 
turpitude and unethical conduct, which would support the termin-
ation for cause as set out in paragraph 1(f) of the employment 
agreement. 
The trial court also found that the evidence presented at 
trial did not preponderate to appellant's benefit that Mrs. 
Hagblom was required by respondent to return $150 of her $300 
bonus and $300 of her $419.85 bonus in cash to plaintiff. As has 
been shown, the testimony of Donna Hagblom and Annie Laurie Baker 
is uncontroverted that the respondent did request these actions on 
the part of Mrs. Hagblom. Nelson v. Trujillo is controlling in 
reversing the trial court's decision because the evidence to 
support the respondent's claim is on its face not convincing. 
The appellant is entitled to have the trial court review 
the evidence regarding unauthorized kickbacks received by the 
respondent from Donna Hagblom and thereby determine whether this 
receipt of funds would constitute unethical conduct or an act of 
moral turpitude. If so, this would justify respondent's termin-
ation pursuant to the language of paragraph 1(f) of the employ-
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ment agreement. 
The failure of the trial court to review these aspects of 
the case serves to make the verdict "plainly unreasonable and 
unjust" as set forth in Nelson v. Trujillo, supra, 
POINT III 
THE ACTS OF RESPONDENT CONSTITUTE UNETHICAL CONDUCT 
Black1s Law Dictionary defines unethical as "not 
ethical; hence colloquiallyf not according to business or profess-
ional standards," Black's Law Dictionary 1698 (Rev. 4th Ed. 
1968). 
The findings of the trial court that appellant is 
entitled to an offset of $105 conclusively demonstrates that the 
conduct of the respondent did not conform to professional 
standards. Fraudulent actions by the employee in his relationship 
with third persons will justify his discharge in case such conduct 
also affects the value of the performance that is due the employer. 
See Conwayy Inc. v. Ross, 627 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Alaska 1981). An 
employee owes a duty to his employer to conduct himself in a 
manner which benefits his employer. See Chiodo v. General 
Waterworks Corp. , 17 Utah 2d 425; 413 P.2d 891, 892 (1966). 
The trial court made a determination for an amount of 
offset on the judgment based upon hours worked by the employees of 
appellant. The court made a distinction between work performed at 
the respondent's residence which benefited the respondent (i.e., 
snow shoveling done while employee was on duty for appellant so 
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respondent could get to work) (R. 106)
 f and the work done for the 
direct benefit of the respondent with no benefit whatsoever to 
appellant (i.e., cleaning respondents house on several occasions 
and servicing respondents evaporative swamp cooler). (R. 
105-106) As noted in Point 1(B), findings of the trial court in 
this instance would subject the respondent to criminal sanctions 
for theft of services. By no stretch of the imagination can it be 
assumed that an employee engaged in criminal activity to the 
detriment of his employer would be acting "ethically". 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, appellant requests this Court 
reverse the decision of the trial court, finding that discharge of 
respondent was justifiable and the acts of respondent which led to 
his discharge were unethical and constituted moral turpitude. In 
the alternative, the appellant seeks a determination that the 
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were in 
error and that appellant is entitled to a new trial. 
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this 26th day of September, 1985. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
ROy G. HASLAM 
Attorney for Appellant 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Thomas R. Grisley, being duly sworn, says: 
That he is employed in the office of Biele, Haslam & 
Hatch, attorneys for appellant, Willow Creek Country Club. 
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of 
appellant's Brief upon the parties to the within described action 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Jeffrey R. Oritt 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Third Floor MONY Plaza 
424 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, first 
class, postage prepaid, on the 26th day of September, 1985. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of 
September, 1985. 
• Wi Lco^y 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
11/6/88 
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ADDENDDM 
Employment Agreement 
Letter dated December 22, 1982 from Kenneth R. Chidester, 
President of Willow Creek Country Club to Jerry W, Aarts 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Amended Judgment 
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
In consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions herein 
contained, WILLOW CREEK COUNTRY CLUB, a non-profit corporation of the State 
of Utah, hereinafter referred to as "Employer11, and JERRY W. AARTS, hereinafter 
referred to as "Mancger", hereby covenant and agree as follows: 
1, Employer hereby agrees to employ Jerry W# Aarts as the manager 
of its club facilities at Sandy City, Salt Lake County, Utah, for an Indeterminate 
term, comn.cncing April 1, 1980, and continuing thereafter, and the Manager 
ayrees thereto, subject to the following terms: 
a. Manager shall serve as "Club Manager" of Willow 
Creek Country Club, and shall be responsible for the maintenance* 
of the main clubhouse facilities, Including the pool area, and 
adjacent areas thereto, and shall devote his full time and capa-
bilities to the welfare of the Club and the described facilities 
•within the framework of directives promulgated by the Board of 
Directors, consistent with the clubhouse rules and By-Laws of 
Willow Creek Country Club, Manager shall be directly accountable 
and responsible to the Board of Directors and officers of the said 
Club. 
b. Manager shall attend all Board Meetings as the Board 
may direct and meetings of the House Committee as the Chairman 
of the House Committee may direct, and shall render such advice 
and assistance and submit such reports as may be requested at 
any time and from time to time, 
c. Manager shall have the exclusive authority of his area 
of responsibility as defined hereinabove, and shall have authority 
to employ and discharge the necessary personnel, including maintenance 
personnel employed In his area of responsibility as he shall determine 
to be necessary for the best Interests of the Club. 
6 
d. Manager shall use all reasonable efforts to enforce 
clubhouse rules and regulations, and shall bring to the attention 
of the Board of Directors any violation of uses or privileges or 
of unbecoming conduct on the part of club members. 
e. Enrployer shall provide Manager with a bond under the 
blanket bond coverage for other employees. The amount of said 
bond is to be determined by the Board of Directors, such bond 
to cov/er the handling and accounting of all monies coming Into 
Manager's hands in connection with his duties as "Club Manager11. 
f. If, at any time during the term of this Contract, 
Manager is unable to discharge any substantial portion of his 
responsibilities hereunder, due to Illness or disability, either* 
physical or mental, this contract shall terminate at the option 
of employer upon thirty days notice to the employee, if, In the 
judgment of the Board of Directors of Employer, Manager falls to 
perform any of his obligations or duties hereunder, and the Board 
of Directors determines that the conduct of the Manager Is unethical, 
involves gross negligence or a breach of moral turpitude, this Contract 
shall terminate at the option of the Employer upon thirty (30} days 
notice to the Manager. In the event, however, the Employer shall 
wish to terminate this Contract without sufficient cause or reason, 
Employer shall pay Manager one-third (1/3) of one year's salary as 
1Iquidated damages. 
g. During the term of this Agreement, Employee shall pay to 
Manager a yearly salary of $36,000.00, from which shall be deducted 
all Federal and State Withholdlng Tax. In addition, Employer shall 
lease and provide for Manager an automobile, providing for maintenance 
and insurance, which shall approximate an additional $4,000*00 per ^ 
year and shall provide an additional $65*00 per month for the payment 
of health and medical Insurance for the use and benefit of Manager* 
All payments due hereunder shall be paid monthly* 
«-2-
h. Manager shall have the right to participate In activities 
and obtain memberships In the State and National organizations which 
may be applicable to club managers; the expense of which shall be 
paid by Employer. 
i. Manager shall receive two (2) weeks vacation per calendar 
year v.hich shall be taken by Manager during the slack season of 
each year, and the time provtded for Manager to attend any National 
Organization applicable to "club managers", local or national, shall 
not be deducted from Manager's regular vacation benefits. All such 
vacation shall be taken In accordance wlth the Employer's vacation 
policy as determined by Its Board of Directors, 
2. The parties to this agreement hereby agree that on or befor* 
January 15, of each calendar year, the Board of Directors of the Employer and 
the "Manager" will review the performance and the salary and benefits paid to 
the Manager and the salary and benefits shall be renegotiated annually on said 
anniversary date by the parties durtng the life of this agreement. 
3* In the event of default by either party to this agreement, 
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses. Including a reasonable 
attorney's fee incurred In enforcing Its terms or In recovering damage for 
its breach. 
4. This agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Employer 
and Manager with respect to the subject matter hereof9 and this Agreement may be 
modified only by an Instrument In writing^executed by the parties hereto* 
DATED this _ 5 q a y of ^ ^ > JT~ , 1380. 
WILLOW CREEK COUNTRY CLUB 
^^Z&JZB-
Its President 
ATTEST 
secretary ' / / / 
22 December 198 2 
Mr. Jerry W. Aarts 
9448 Fox Drive Circle 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Re: Willow Creek Country Club 
Dear Mr. Aarts, 
Reference is made to your Employment Agreement with Willow 
Creek Country Club wherein you-are now acting as Manager. It 
has come to the attention of the Board of Directors that you 
have been- engaged in activities which are detrimental to the 
club and which violate the terms and conditions of the contract 
as are described in paragraph 1 (f) . 
The Board of Directors hereby gives you notice that your 
employment as Manager of Willow Creek Country Club shall be 
terminated as of the 23rd day of January, 1983. 
It is the desire of the Board of Directors that you immediately 
vacate the premises of Willow Creek Country Club and provide no 
further services during the thirty (30) days notice period. Upon 
completion of an audit, you will be paid your final monthly salary 
to the date of termination. 
Very truly yours, 
Willow Creek Country Club 
Kenneth R. Chidester 
Prssident 
KRC/ccb 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY AARTS, - : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
WILLOW CREEK COUNTRY CLUB, 
a Utah corporation, : Civil No. C83-2383 
: (Judge David B. Dee) 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before this Court, the Honorable David B. Dee presiding, on 
March 20, 1985 at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by 
Jeffrey Oritt; defendant was represented by Roy G. Haslam. The 
Court, having read all pleadings and memoranda submitted by the 
parties in support of their respective positions, having heard 
testimony from witnesses for both sides and having heard argu-
ment from counsel, having reviewed all documentary evidence, 
being fully advised in the premises herein, and good cause 
appearing therefor, hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Jerry Aarts is an individual residing 
in the State of New York. At the time of the evenU pertaining 
to this lawsuit, he resided in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Willow Creek Country Club is a not-
for-profit Utah corporation located in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
3. On September 5, 1980, plaintiff was hired by 
defendant to be~trfreir club manager. Pursuant to that hiring, 
plaintiff and defendant executed an Employment Agreement in 
which the conditions of plaintiff's employment, including the 
obligations of both plaintiff and defendant, were outlined. 
4. Defendant agreed to pay plaintiff an initial 
annual salary of $36,000. Effective January 1, 1982, and until 
plaintiff was terminated, his annual salary was $41,400. 
5. Defendant terminated plaintiff as its manager on 
December 22, 1982. The effective date of the termination was 
January 23, 1983. 
6. The Employment Agreement between defendant and 
plaintiff discusses termination for cause at Kl(f). Termina-
tion for cause could only take place because plaintiff had 
engaged in conduct that was unethical or involved gross negli-
gence or moral turpitude. 
7. The Employment Agreement requires defendant to 
pay plaintiff one-third (1/3) of his annual salary at the time 
of his termination as liquidated damages if defendant termi-
nates the plaintiff without cause. 
8. After terminating plaintiff, defendant failed, 
and refused, to pay plaintiff one-third (1/3) of his annual 
salary as liquidated damages. 
9. The Employment Agreement provides for court costs 
and attorney's fees in the event™" the Agreement is enforced 
through litigation by either plaintiff or defendant. 
10. In its defense of this action, defendant alleged 
a number of events that it claims fulfill the "cause" require-
ment for termination without liability for liquidated damages. 
Defendant also filed a Counterclaim. At the conclusion of the 
trial in this matter, defendant withdrew the following claims 
for damages that it made in its Counterclaim: 
(a) $1,900 in living expenses and travel 
expenses paid to Frank Rotunno; 
(b) $300 of Frank Rotunno's bonus, which defen-
dant alleged plaintiff forced Rotunno to return to him in cash; 
and 
(c) $300 of Donna Hagblom's $419.85 bonus, and 
$150 of her $300 bonus, which defendant alleged plaintiff 
forced her to return to him in cash. 
11. During the course of plaintiff's employment with 
defendant, and in response to plaintiff's request, Kevin 
Stewart, a maintenance man employed by defendant, cleaned 
plaintiff's house on several occasions, working a total of 12 
hours. Plaintiff paid Stewart occasionally for these services, 
which Stewart provided while he was on duty at the Willow Creek 
Country Club. 
12. During the course of plaintiff's employment with 
defendant, and in response to plaintiff's request, Steve 
Draper, another maintenance man employed by defendant, plowed 
out plaintiff's driveway on one occasion when plaintiff, who 
had no snow removal equipment, needed to get to work at Willow 
Creek Country Club. The snow shoveling was done by Draper, 
while he was on duty, for the benefit of Willow Creek Country 
Club. 
13. During the course of plaintiff's employment with 
defendant, and in response to plaintiff's request, Draper ser-
viced plaintiff's evaporative ("swamp") cooler for approxi-
mately two hours while he was on duty for Willow Creek Country 
Club. 
14. From August, 1982 through December, 1982, plain-
tiff hired and employed Jeanette Wilhelm as a food service con-
sultant. She worked irregular hours, at the sole direction of 
plaintiff, and provided ideas and implementation concerning 
various aspects of defendant's food service operations. Her 
compensation between August and December, 1982, was in the form 
of checks from defendant's General Fund, signed by plaintiff on 
behalf of defendant. No Federal or State taxes or FICA monies 
were withheld from her checks. 
15. In December, 1982, plaintiff signed two checks to 
Bruce R. Hewitt, one in the amount of $46.65, and one in the 
amount of $565.25. Taxes and FICA monies were withheld from 
these checks. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the $46.65 check was Mr. Hewitt's Christmas bonus, 
and the $565.25 check, which was to compensate Ms. Wilhelm for 
certain hours she had worked at Willow Creek Country Club, was 
made payable to Mr. Hewitt at Jeanette Wilhelm's request. 
16. From April through August, 1982, plaintiff wrote 
checks from the General Fund totalling approximately $1,900 to 
Frank Rotunno, which were for living expenses and travel 
expenses, and from which no taxes or FICA monies were with-
held. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
plaintiff obtained authorization for the payment of such 
expenses to Mr. Rotunno, and in such manner, when he obtained 
the approval of Willow Creek Country Club Board Member Jerry 
Butterfield to retain Mr. Rotunno .on the same basis that 
Rotunno was retained by plaintiff between November, 1981, and 
January, 1982, at which time such living and travel expenses, 
and the method of payment, were approved by Club Treasurer Jay 
Berquist. The Court also finds by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that plaintiff was paid living and travel expenses by 
defendant for the first several months he was employed by 
defendant, and that no taxes or FICA were withheld from his 
checks at that time. 
17. During 1982, plaintiff wrote bonus checks to 
Donna Hagblom in the amount of $300 and $419,85, and a bonus 
check to Frank Rotunno in the amount of $300. The Court finds 
that the evidence presented at trial did not preponderate to 
defendant's benefit that Ms. Hagblom was required by plaintiff 
to return $150 of her $300 bonus, and $300 of her $419.85 
bonus, in cash to plaintiff, nor did the evidence preponderate 
to defendant's benefit that Mr. Rotunno was required by plain-
tiff to return $150 of his $300 bonus in cash to plaintiff. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pur-
suant to § 78-3-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended)* 
2. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 
§ 78-13-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
3. None of plaintiff's actions as found above are 
acts of gross negligence, unethical conduct, or moral turpitude. 
4. Plaintiff must reimburse defendant for the ser-
vices of its maintenance men, for a total of fourteen hours at 
$5 per hour, plus $35 for transportation costs, or a total off-
set of $105. 
5. Defendant breached its Employment Agreement with 
plaintiff, in that it terminated plaintiff without cause and 
failed to pay plaintiff one-third (1/3) of his annual salary as 
liquidated damages. 
6. Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of 
$13,800, plus interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum from 
January 23, 1983, to the date of Judgment rendered herein. 
7. Plaintiff is entitled to $41.50 in court costs 
and $3,500 in attorneys' fees, incurred in enforcing the 
Employment Agreement. 
DATED this day of April, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
David B. Dee 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Biele, Haslam & Hatch 
RoV G. Haslam 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY AARTS, 
P l a i n t i f f , ; A M E N D E D 
J U D G M E N T 
vs • : 
WILLOW CREEK COUNTRY CLUB, : 
a Utah corporation, : Civil No, C83-2383 
: (Judge David B. Dee) 
Defendant, : 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before this Court, the Honorable David B. Dee presiding, on 
March 20, 1985 at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by 
Jeffrey Oritt; defendant was represented by Roy G. Haslam. The 
Court, having read all pleadings and memoranda submitted by the 
parties in support of their respective positions, having heard 
testimony from witnesses for both sides, having heard argument 
from counsel, having reviewed all documentary evidence, being 
fully advised in the premises herein, and having made and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Under plaintiff's Cause of Action, plaintiff is 
entitled to the sum of $13,800, together with interest at the 
rate of twelve percent per annum from January 23, 1983, to the 
date of Judgment herein, 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to the costs of this action 
in the amount of $41.50 and attorneys* fees in the amount of 
$3,500, as set forth in plaintiff's Affidavit of Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs. 
3. Defendant is entitled to an offset of $105 
against the above Judgment. 
DATED this day of April, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
i J , i • -. ... M X : 
Biele, Haslam & Hatch 
Roy AG J hasiam 
Attorney for Defendant 
D5tfid"B. Dee 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
The foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT and accompanying 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW were prepared by 
Jeffrey Oritt, counsel for the plaintiff, and hand-delivered to 
Roy G. Haslam, counsel for the defendant, on this 2nd day of 
April, 1985. 
~ / / 
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